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The 'Right to Die' :
Legislative and Judicial Developments
Dennis J. Horan

Mr. Horan is chairman of the Right to Live /Right to Die Committee
of the A merican Bar Association and gave this talk to the m edicine
and law committee of the Association at its annual meeting in 1977.

One of the legal dilemmas of our electronic age is too much unnecessary legislation enacted too soon and in response to too many nonproblems. This is especially true in the legal-medical area where physicians are slowly being hemmed in by such legislation and are finding
themse lves unable to practice their art and to exercise their best
judgment in doing so . Living Will or Natural Death legislation is a
typical example of that phenomenon.
California recently passed a Living Will provision entitled "The
Natural Death Act."l Seven other states have followed suit, but with
variable approaches. 2 Although hailed by many as a necessary and
important piece of legislation giving another fundamental freedom to
persons and protection to physicians, in fact, it gives nothing to persons which they do not already possess under the law , nor does it add
any additional legal protection to doctors which they do not already
possess . The immunity granted by the bill may be of doubtful constit utional validity and is certainly a doubtfully meritorious statement of
public policy when one considers that there exist no reported cases of
either criminal or civi l liability against doctors arising out of the termination of treatment to terminal patients. If anything, the California
bill adds officious burdens to the death bed, encumbers medical decisions with unnecessary additional consultations and creates, rather
than clarifies, legal problems.
The Californ ia Act does not allow or hasten m ercy killing, which is
strictly prohibited either by active means or by mere omission. Some
have argued that living will legislation is the opening wedge towards
the ultimate legalization of euthanasia . 3 Since this legislation, in itself,
adds nothing to the legal rights people already possess under the law,
nor gives physicians additional protections not already possessed (presuming an absence of homicidal intent), there may be some truth in
this charge. For example, Prof. Yale Kamisar points out in his famous
article 4 that the living will may be the first step towards the ultimate
legalization of mercy killing. On the other hand, however, one can also
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argue that since this legislation adds nothing which does not already
exist in the law it cannot, therefore, be considered such an opening
wedge but is, rather, a mere codification for clarification purposes of
the existing state of the law. Between these extremes lies the truth.
Adult persons of sound mind have a right to refuse medical treatment unless some equal and countervailing rights of other persons
would be substantially jeopardized by such a refusa1. 5 For example, it
has been consistently held by the courts that the right of a pregnant
woman to refuse medical treatment must give way to the unborn
child's right to life. Under those circumstances, courts have consistently overruled the mother's right to refuse m edical treatment, even
when it may flow from a First Amendment protection - namely, the
free exercise of religion.
Consequently, adult persons of sound mind may reject m edical
treatment even though the result may be their own death. Such a
decision has not been construed either as suicide or euthanasia by
most commentators in spite of the consistent confusion that the concept of passive euthanasia causes. 6 The problem becomes particularly
difficult in the situation where the person is either not competent to
give consent, or is comatose or unconscious and unable to consent.
These issues were recently litigated in three cases: the Quinlan case , 7
the Saikewicz case 8 and the Dockery case. 9 In each of these cases the
courts ultimately held that refusal to accept the treatm ent could be
made on behalf of the unconscious or incompetent by the next of kin
who had been appointed conservator or guardian. No statutory
authority or guidelines existed in any of these three states where these
cases were litigated. The courts made such decisions based upon the
application of traditional rules of equity and their understanding of
the medical-legal principles involved.
States Pass Legislation
In 1977, eight states attempted to close what is felt to be a legislative gap by passing legislation variously described as Natural Death
Acts or Living Will Acts or Right to Die Acts. There are at least 59
other bills pending in 42 states. The purpose of this paper will be to
analyze the eight bills which have been thus far passed in order to help
clarify some of the issues and to determine whether or not such legislation is beneficial as a solution to this problem.
My own view is that the legislation is not beneficial and is indeed
counter-productive. I say this because I see the solution as lying in the
area of the patient-physician relationship - a highly personal relationship and an area in which I do not like legislative intru sion unless it is
absolutely impossible to otherwise solve or circumscribe a legal problem , which I do not believe to be the case.
In each of the cases I have previously mentioned, the reasons given
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by the court for the necessity of intruding into this physician-patient
relationship in order to solve this problem are the fear of physicians
and hospitals of malpractice suits and criminal prosecution. Yet,
today, there are no reported cases of either criminal or civil liability
being assessed against the doctor or hospital arising out of the termination of treatment for terminal patients. 10 Why then do we have this
extraordinary spate of legislative activity in an area where no liability
exists on the books? Is it because liability is deemed probable and
suits may be filed, or is it because of the activities of special interest
groups such as the Euthanasia Society or the Society for the Right to
Die?
The Society for the Right to Die has been very active in pursuing the
enactment of living will statutes throughout the nat ion . Perhaps this
accounts for the fact that such legislation during 1976 and 1977 was
introduced into almost all 50 state legislatures. The Society for the
Right to Die publishes a legislative manual containing its own model
statute which has been introduced into many legislatures. The manual
also contains copies and analyses of the statutes introduced into the
various states.
The Society for the Right to Die is closely connected to the Euthanasia Society and the Euthanasia Educational Council. It is this close
relationship which has prompted many people to see the living will as
the first step towards the ultimate legalization of euthanasia, which is
currently classed as homicide. However, putting such speculation aside
for the present, let us return to an .analysis of the legislation involved.
As in the execution of any will, the major problem and cause for
litigation (other than interpretation of the will itself) is the voluntariness of the execution or the consent. Such is also the case for the
living will as we will discuss shortly.
A far more important problem created by these acts and one which
would probably surprise its sponsors is that, in my opinion, living will
legislation will inhibit rather than increase the physician's ability to
solve with dignity and grace the problem of the dying patient. Anytime a statute is passed regulating conduct and creating rewards and
punishments for non-compliance, such an act has the effect of chilling
or inhibiting similar conduct otherwise legal but now not in conformity with the act. Consequently, the effect of these acts will be to
chill and inhibit otherwise lawful conduct of a physician in withdrawing life-sustaining means unless such a living will has been made by the
patient. If even 20% of the populace executes such living wills - a
figure I doubt will be attained - still another 80% will reach the
terminal never having executed such a document.
The physician will probably assume that he cannot now withdraw
life-sustaining measures unless h e has a directive from the patient in
compliance with the act. California has sought to avoid this problem
by including Section 7193 , which indicates that the act does not
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impair or supersede any legal right or responsibility a person may have
to effect the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in a lawful manner. Few of the other statutes have dealt with the problem.
A better approach of the legislature would have been to pass an act
stating that life-sustaining measures may be withdrawn when this may
be done in the judgment of the attending physician under usual and
customary standards of medicine . Here is an example:
Life-s ustaining measures may be term inated by the attending physician
whe n , in hi s judgment, based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty
according to usual and customary standards of medicine , it is proper to do
so.

This would constitute an affirmative statement by the legislature
that physicians can terminate useless treatment and thus presumably
dispel the medical confusion on this point.
It is understood that hospital aides, nurses or technicians who act
upon a lawful order of a physician are not liable for doing so, and it is
not necessary to say so in the statute. If the order itself constitutes
malpractice, mayhem or murder and should have been known to be so
by the aide or nurse, or is carried out by them negligently, then that is
another matter.
The grant of immunity to the treating physician, which is a universal aspect of these statutes, is most curious in these days of seeming
mistrust of the medical profession. Immunity is probably granted to
ensure physician support of these bills, but not even sacred immunity
has been able to make the medical profession support such legislation.
I think the reason is that most doctors handle terminally ill situations
now without any of the mess or fuss brought about by this legislation.
Most feel qualified to handle the situation and, if hospital cooperation
and family support can be obtained, will have no difficulty - indeed,
less difficulty with such situations without a statute than with one.
In addition, customary methods and standards in medicine change
continuously. There is no way that particularized medical practice can
be legislated. Will we pass statutes saying when and under what circumstances an appendix mayor must be removed? The better
approach seems to me to leave the determination of the customary
standards of medicine in the hands of the physicians. If they overstep
the bounds of what is proper, legally or morally, then society should
act to correct this condition. The physician's judgment must be relied
upon by society in these matters. Elements of that judgment can be
controlled by statutes prohibiting unwanted conduct such as Section
7188 of the California Act which "prohibits" mercy killing. But the
homicide laws do this anyway. It is a misunderstanding of the current
status of medical-legal principles which causes the confusion. Unfortunately the California Natural Death Act has compounded those
problems rather seriously .
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Family Consent a Separate Problem
Whether or not a physician obtains a consent from the family or
next of kin for terminating life-sustaining measures is a separate problem involving freedo m from potential suit. This is entirely distinct
from the exercise of the physician's judgment in determin ing that the
life-sustaining method should be terminated , or in obtaining an
informed voluntary consent from the patient himself for the termination of treatment. As a matter of pruden ce, the physician should
obviously obtain such consents from the family when the patient is
unable to voluntarily consent. Such a consent at least precludes those
who gave consent from maintaining an action .
Voluntary consent is the difficult problem and the California
statute does not make that problem any easier. In fact, it compounds
it by 1) using, in Sections 7186 and 7188, language t hat conditions
the validity of the directive to a voluntary consent given when the
patient was of sound mind (How in the world can a physician know
that?), and 2) not clarifying in Section 7191(b) that the co nclusive
presumption may not be rebutted by evidence of the unsound mind of
the declarant at the time the directive was executed. In addition,
Section 7190 conditions its immunity grant on compliance with the
act. Presumably, failure to follow the act vitiates the immunity.
Section 7191(c) aggravates the problem further by only giving
"weight" to the directive (when the patient becomes a qualified
patient subsequent to executing the directive) as evidence of the
patient's directions, but then indicates that he " may " (read must now)
consider other factors such as information from the family and even
the totality of the circumstances. This section [7191( c)] destroys the
entire utility of the act in its present form as far as the apparent intent
of the legislature is concern ed. This section is the one that will probably be applicable to most patients dying in a hospital. That is, most
of these will be patients who have executed the directive previously,
but have not re-executed it since becoming a qualified patient. For all
these patients the directive will merely be a piece of paper indicating
the desires of a patient with little or no legal significance. That is no
more (and less effective) than what the patient could have accomplished anyway with a hand-written letter to a loved one. Such a letter
would probably mean more to the attending physician anyway. A
formalized directive will cause him endless worry and frustration wondering whether the d eclarant was of sound mind when th e directive
was executed, worrying about whether the directive has ever been
revoked, calling his personal attorney for an opinion on his immunity,
conferring with the hospital attorneys and discovering that they disagree with his personal attorney (or vice versa), conferring with the
hospital ethics committee only to discover that they disagree with the
lawyers, and last, but not least, learning to his chagrin that the statute
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requires him to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding
execution of the document so that he can "justify effectuating the
directive." In addition, Section 7191(a) mandates that the physicians
determine that the directive complies with the law and if the patient is
mentally competent, and the action to be taken is in "accord with the
desires of the qualified patient," then the action may be taken.
In plain language, this means that if the patient is competent and
alert the doctor should disregard the directive and obtain an informed
consent from the patient to terminate the treatment. If the patient is
not competent and alert, then 7191(c) requires the physician to make
an inordinate investigation into the surrounding circumstances concerning the execution of that directive. Who needs such a statute?
Certainly not the doctors. Nor does it help the patient or his concerned family.
As an example of the complexity thrust upon the shoulders of the
attending physician by the California act, let me pose one illustration.
Section 7191(a) states that prior to effecting a withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient pursuant
to the directive, the attending physician shall determine that the
directive complies with Section 7188. Section 7188 is the section
which determines the correct form for the execution of the document
and the form of the document itself. This section requires that the
directive "shall" be signed by the declarant in the presence of two
witnesses who are not related to him by blood or marriage and who
would not be entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant
upon his decease under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto
then existing, or, at the time of the directive, by operation of law then
existing. How in the world is any physician supposed to know that the
witnesses are not related to the declarant, nor are they getting any
portion of his or her estate when he or she dies? Presumably Section
7191(a) applies to a patient who is competent and can discuss such
things with the physician or the witnesses are available to do so. In
any event, why should the attending physician be involved in matters
of this sort when his job is to take care of a human being who is in a
terminal condition - certainly the most psychologically difficult time
of most people's lives? This intrusion into the patient-physician relationship seems totally unwarranted and cannot, in the long run, h elp
raise the quality of medical care or the relationship between physician
and patient.
Other States Passed Law
The other seven states which have recently passed such legislation
are Arkansas, North Carolina, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, Idaho and
Oregon.
The Arkansas law differs substantially from the California Act. The
Arkansas law contains only four sections. The first declares that every
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person has a right to die with dignity and a right to refuse and deny
the use or application of artificial, extraordinary, extreme, or radical
medical or surgical means or procedures calculated to prolong life.
Alternatively every person has a right to request that such means be
used to prolong his life as long as possible. Section 2 allows the execution of a will containing such a directive.
Section 3 is a radical departure from the California bill in that it
allows execution of such a directive by one person on behalf of
another. This section allows a person to execute such a directive for a
minor or an adult who is incompetent. The statute gives certain priorities as to who may execute such a directive on behalf of a minor or
incompetent. It begins by giving the right to either parent of the
minor, or -to a spouse. If the spouse is unwilling or unable to act, then
"his child" age 18 or over may act. However, if he has more than one
child age 18 or over, then a decision may be made by a majority of
such children . (Can one visualize a family of 7 children over 18 casting
ballots on this issue?). If he is mentally incompetent, the directive can
be executed by a legally appointed guardian provided that two physicians state that extraordinary means would have to be utilized to
prolong his life. The last section of the act grants immunity to the
physicians or anyone else assisting.
The North Carolina bill contains an addition to the right to a natural death - a definition of irreversible cessation of brain function.
The North Carolina Act allows for withholding extraordinary means
upon certain conditions if the declarant is determined to be terminal
and incurable. It requires that the document be proved before a clerk
or assistant clerk of the Superior Court who certifies that the witnesses appeared before him and swore that they observed the declarant sign this declaration and also swore that they were not related
within the third degree to the declarant or to the declarant's spouse
and that they would not be entitled to any portion of the estate of the
declarant upon the declarant's death and that they were not a physician attending the declarant or an employee of an attending physician,
or of a health facility in which the declarant was a patient, or of a
nursing home or any group care home and that they had no claim
against the declarant. The procedure for proving up the document
before the clerk indicates that it may be accepted on the testimony of
two witnesses or, if only one witness is available, then upon the testimony of such witness and upon the proof of the handwriting of the
witness who is dead or whose testimony is unavailable . The statute,
unlike the Arkansas bill, specifically allows for revocation. Once again,
the act grants immunity from civi l or criminal liability to the physician and all those who assist.
The North Carolina bill, unlike most of the legislation in this area,
also includes a definition of brain death.
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The New Mexico bill is substantially similar to the model bill
promulgated by the Society for the Right to Die. It includes other
provisions which were borrowed from the California Act, but basically
it, like the other statutes, allows for the execution of a document for
the refusal of "maintenance medical treatment." It also contains a
section allowing the document to be executed on behalf of a terminally ill minor, but the execution of such document must be done with
the same formalities as are required of a valid will under their Probate
code. The statute allows for revocation, grants immunity to the physicians and requires two physicians to certify to the terminal illness.
The Nevada bill is similar in some respects to the California statute,
but does not use the same terms or definitions. Again immunity is
granted to the physician.
The Texas bill is the same as the California bill. The Idaho bill is
substantially similar to the California statute, as is the Oregon bill.

Most Important Element
The single most important element of each of these bills is the time
when the directive becomes effective. It is this element of the statute
which controls the entire act and prohibits the use of such legislation
to foster mercy killing. Of course, the statute can be amended on the
books at some later date to allow mercy killing, or, worse yet, can be
"amended" in practice by those who have a mind to, to allow mercy
killing now.
The California Act allows the directive to become operative only
when the patient is terminal, which is defined as a condition caused by
injury, disease or illness which, regardless of the applications of lifesustaining procedures would, within reasonable medical judgment,
produce death and where the application of life-sustaining procedures
serves only to postpone the moment of death of the patient. Such a
carefully restrictive definition which obviously precludes mercy killing
should be compared with the Arkansas bill, which is completely
devoid of any such definitions and merely grants to every person a
right to reject any means of artificial, extraordinary, extreme, or
radical medical or surgical means or procedures calculated to prolong
his life.
The remaining acts require a terminal condition, which is usually
defined as restrictively as is the California bill.
For all but the Arkansas statute then, the time when the directive
becomes effective (in the sense that it may be put into actual use) is
the time when a person is in an incurably terminal condition where
the use of extraordinary medical means serves only to prolong the
moment of death. This definition is a reasonable time, if time there
must be, when living will statutes become effective.
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EXHffiIT A
CALIFORNIA
A_3060
ENACTED 1976
In troduc ed by Assem bly m an Barry Keene, 2/ 13/ 76
Passed by Assembly (43- 22), 6117/76
Passed by Sena te (22 -1 4), 8 / 26/76
Signed by Gov. Edmund G. Bmwn, Jr., 9/ 30/76
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
NATURAL DEATH ACT
Sec. 7185
This act sh a ll be known and m ay b e c ited as th e Natural Death Act.
Sec . 7186
The Leg islature find s that adult p erso ns have the fund a m en ta l right to co ntrol t he
dec isions relating to t h e re nd ering of their own medica l care , inc ludin g th e
decision to have li fe-s usta ining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a
te rminal co nd ition.
The Legislature furth er finds t h at mod ern med ica l technology h as made
possible the a rti fic ia l p rolongat ion of hum an life beyo nd natural lim its.
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The Legislature further finds that, in the interest of protecting individual
autonomy, such prolongation of life for persons with a terminal condition may
cause loss of patient dignity, and unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing
nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the patient.
The Legislature further finds that there exists considerable uncertainty in t h e
medical and legal professions as to the lega lity of terminating the use or
application of life-sustaining procedures where the patient has voluntarily and in
sound mind evidenced a desire that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn.
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients have a right to expect,
the Legislature hereby declares that the laws of the State of Cali fornia shall
recognize th e right of an adult person to make a written directive instructing his
physician to withh old or withd raw life-sustaining procedures in the event of a
terminal condition.
Sec. 7187
The fo llowin g defini tions shall govern the constructio n of this chap ter:
(a) "Attending physician " means the physician se lected by, or ass igned to, th e
patient who has primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the
pati ent .
( b) "Directive" means a written document voluntar il y executed by the declarant
in accordance with the requirements of Section 7188. The directive , or a copy
of the directive , shall be made part of the patient's medical records.
(c) "Life-sustaining procedure " means any medical procedure or intervention
which utilizes mechanical or other artificia l m eans to sustain, restOl·e , or
supplant a vital function, which, when applied to a qualified patient, would
serve only to artificially prolong the moment of death and where, in the
judgment of the attend ing physician , death is imminent wheth er or not such
procedures are utilized . "Life-sustaining procedure" shall not include t he
administration of medication or the performance of any medical procedure
deemed necessary to a ll ev iate pain.
(d) "Physician" m ea ns a physician and surgeon licensed by the Board of Medical
Quality Assurance or the Board of Osteopathic Examiners.
(e) "Qualifi ed pati ent" m eans a patient diagnosed a nd certified in writing to be
afflicted with a terminal condition by two physicians, one of whom shall be
the attending physician, who have personally examined the patient.
(f) "Te,-minal condition" means an in curable condition caused by injury, disease,
or illness, which, regardless of the app lication of life-sustaining proc edures,
would, within reasonab le medical judgment, produce death, and wh ere the
application of life-sustaining procedures, serve on ly to postpon e the moment
of death of the patient.
Sec_ 7188
Any adu lt perso n may execute a directive directing t h e w ithh o lding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining procedures in a terminal cond ition. The direct ive shall be signed
by the declarant in the presence of two witnesses not related to the declarant by
blood or marriage and who would not b e entitled to any port ion of the estate o f
the d ec larant upon hi s decease under any will of the declarant or cod icil th ereto
then ex isting or, at the time of th e directive , by operatio n of law then existing. In
addition, a witness to a directive shall not be the attending physician , an employee
of the attending physician or a health fac ili ty in whic h t he declarant is a patient,
or a ny person who h as a cla im aga inst any pOl-tion of the estate of the d eclarant
upon his decease at the time of the execution of the directive. The directive shall
be in the following form:
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DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS
Directive made this _ _ _ __

day of _ _ _ __ _ _ _---\( month, year).

I,
being of sound mind , willfully, and voluntarily m ake known
my desire that my life shall not be artificially prolonged und er the circumstances
set forth below , do hereby declare:
l. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease , or illness certified to

2.

3.

4.

5.

be a terminal condition by two physicians, and where the application of
life-sustaining procedures would serve only to artificjally prolong the moment
of my death and where my physician determin es that my death is imminent
whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized , I direct that such
procedures be withh eld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally.
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such
life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this directive shall b e
honored by my family and physici an(s) as the final express ion 0 f my legal
right to refuse medical or surgical treatment an d accept the consequences from
such refusal.
If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my
physician, this directive shall have no force or effect during the course of my
pregnancy.
I have bee n diagnosed at least 14 days ago as having a terminal condition by
_______ , M.D. , whose address is
, and whose telephone
number is
. I understand that if I have not filled in the physician's
name and address, it shall be presumed that I did not have a terminal con dition
when I mad e out this directive.
This directive shall have no force or effect five years from the date filled in
above.

6. I understand the full import of this directive and I am emotionally and
mentally competent to make this directive.
Signed _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____
City, County and State of Residence
The declarant has been p erso nally known to m e and I b eli eve him or her to be
of sound mind.
Witness _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __
Witness _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

Sec. 7188.5
A directive shall have no force or effect if the d ec larant is a patient in a skilled
nursing facility as defin ed in subdivision (c) of Section 1250 at the time the
directive is executed unless one of the two witnesses to the direct ive is a patient
advocate or ombudsman as may be d esignated by the State Department of Aging
for this purpose pursuant to any other applicable provision of law . The patient
advocate or ombudsman shall have the same qualifications as a witness under
Section 7188.
The intent of this section is to recognize that so me pati ents in skilled nursing
facilities may be so insulated from a voluntary decision making role , by virtue of
the custodial nature of their care, as to require special assurance that t h ey are
capable of willfully and voluntarily exec uting a directive.
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Sec. 7189
(a) A directive may be revoked at any time by the declarant , without regard to his
mental state or competency, by any of t h e fo llowing meth ods:
1. By being canceled, defaced, obliterated, o r burnt , torn, or otherwise
destroyed by the declarant or by som e person in his presence and by his
direction.
2. By a written revocat ion of the declarant ex pressing his intent to revoke,
signed and dated by t h e declarant. Such revocation shall b ec ome effec tive
only upon communication to t h e attending physician by t he declarant or
by a person acting on behalf of the declarant. Th e attending physician shall
record in the patient's medical record the time and date when h e received
notification of the written revocatio n .
3. By a verbal ex pression by the d ecl ara n t of his in tent to revoke the
dir e ctive. Such revocat ion s h al l b ecome effec tive only upon
co mmuni cation to the attending physician by the declara nt or by a p erson
acting on b ehalf of the declarant. The a tte nding phy sician shall record in
the patient 's medical record the ti m e, d ate, and pl ace of the revocation a nd
the t ime, date , and place, if different, of when h e received noti ficat ion of
the revocation.
(b) There shall be no cri mina l or civil liability on the part of any p erson for fa ilure
to act upon a revocat io n made pursuant to this section unless that p erso n h as
actual know ledge of the revocatio n .

Sec. 7189.5
A directive shall be effective for five years fro m t h e d ate of execution thereof
unless sooner revoked in a manner prescrib ed in Sec. 7189. Nothing in this chapter shall be constru ed to preve nt a declarant fro m reexecuting a directive at a ny
ti m e in accordance with the formalities of Sec. 718 8, including reexecution subsequent to a diagnosis of a term in al condition. If the declarant h as exec uted more
t h an one directive, suc h time shall b e determined from t he date of exec ution of
the last directive known to the attending physician. If the d eclaran t becomes
co m atose or is rendered incapable of communicat ing with the atte nding phy sici an ,
the directive sh all remain in effect for t h e duration of th e comatose c ondition or
unti l such time as the dec larant's condition renders him or h er able to com·
municate with the attending physician.
Sec. 7190
No physician or h ealth faci li ty which, acting in accordance with t h e require me n ts
of t his chapter, causes the withholding or withdrawal of li fe -sustai n ing p rocedu res
from a quali fied patient, shall be su bj ect to civil liability t h erefrom. No licensed
health profession al, acting under t h e .direction of a physician, who participates in
the withholding or withd rawal of life-susta ining procedures in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter shall be subject to a ny civil liability. No physician , or
licensed h ealth professional acting under the direction of t he physician, who
participates in the withholdin g or withdrawal of li fe·su stai ning procedures in
accordance w ith t h e provisions of t his chapter shall b e guilty of a ny criminal act
or of unprofessional conduct.
Sec. 7191.
(a) Prior to effecting a withholding or withdrawal o f li fe-sustaining procedures
from a qualified patient pursuant to the directive, t h e attend ing ph ysician sh all
dete rmine that the directive complies with Sec. 7188, a nd , if t h e patient is
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mentally competent, t h at the directive and all steps proposed by the attending
physician to be undertaken are in accord with the desires of the qualified
patient.
(b) If t he d ec larant was a qualified patient at least 14 days prior to executing or
reexecuting the directive, the directive shall be conclusively presumed, unless
revoked, to be the directions of th e patient regarding the withholding or
withdrawal of li fe-s ustaining procedures. No p hysician, and no licensed health
professional acting under the direction of a physician , shall be criminally or
civilly liable for failing to effectuate the directive of the qualified patient pursuant to this subdivision. A failure by a physician to effectuate the directive of
a qualified patient pursuant to this division shall constitute unprofessional
cond uct if t h e physician refuses to make t h e necessary arrangements , or fails
to take t h e necessary steps, to effect the transfer of the qualified patient to
anoth er physician who will effectuate the directive of the qualified patient.
(c) If t h e declarant becomes a qualifi ed patient subsequent to executing th e
directive, and h as not subsequently reexecuted t h e directive, the attending
physician may give weight to the directive as evid ence of the patient's directions regarding the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures and
may co nsider other factors, such as information from the affected family or
the nature of t h e patient's illness , injury, or disease, in determining whether
t h e totality of circ umstances known to the attend ing physician justify effect uating the directive. No physician, and no licensed health professional acting
under the directive of a physician, sh all be criminall y or civilly liable for failing
to effectuate t h e directive of the quali fied patient pursuant to this subdivision.
Sec. 7192
(a) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified
patient in accordance with t h e provisions of this chapter shall not, for any
purpose, constitute a suicide.
(b) The m aking of a directive pursu ant to Sec. 7188 sh all not restrict, inhibit, or
impair in any manner the sa le , procurement, or issuance of any policy of life
insurance, nor sh all it be deemed to modify the terms of an existing policy of
li fe insura nce. No policy of life insurance sh all be legally impaired or invalidated in any manner by t h e withh olding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
procedures from an insured qualified patient, notwithstanding any term of the
pul icy to the con trary .
(c) No physician, h ealt h fac ility, or oth er h ealth provider, and no health care
service plan, insurer issui ng disability insurance, self-insured employee we lfare
benefit plan, or nonprofit hospital service plan , shall require any person to
execute a directive as a condition for being insured for , or receiving, health
care services.
Sec. 7193
Nothing in this chapter shall impair or supersede any legal right or legal responsibility w h ich any person may h ave to effect the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining procedures in any lawfu l manner. In such respect the provisions of
t hi s chapter are cu m ulative.
Sec. 7194
Any person w h o w illfull y concea ls, cancels, defaces , obliterates, or damages t h e
directive of another without such declarant's consent shall be guilty of a misdem eanor. Any person who , except where justified or excused by law , falsifies or
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forges the directive of another, or will fully conceals or withholds personal
knowledge of a revocation as provided in Section 7189, with the intent to cause a
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures contrary to the wishes of
the declarant, and thereby, because of any such act, directly causes life-sustaining
procedures to be withheld or withdrawn and death to thereby be hastened, shall
be subject to prosecution for unlawful homicide as provided in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 187) of Title 8 of Part 1 of the Penal Code.
Sec. 7195
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve
mercy killing, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life
other than to permit the natural process of dying as provided in this chapter.

SECTION 2
If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circum-

stances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.

SECTION 3
Notwithstanding Section 2231 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, there shall be
no reimbursement pursuant to this section nor shall there be any appropriation
made by this act because the Legislature recognized that during any legislative
session a variety of changes to laws relating to crimes and infractions may cause
both increased and decreased costs to local government entities and school districts which , in the aggregate, do not result in significant identifiable cost changes.
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